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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARGOT de VILLIERS, : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
UTAH COUNTY, HIGHLAND CITY, : 
and JOHN DOES 1-3, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
: Appeal No. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal arises from a final judgment of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah. The 
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-2(3)(j) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did genuine issues of material fact preclude summary 
judgment? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary judgment is proper only when there are 
no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352 (Utah 
1991); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 819 P. 2d 803 (Utah 
1991). On review of a summary judgment, the losing party is 
entitled to have all the facts presented, and all the inferences 
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fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most favorable to 
him. Winegar v. Froerer Corp.. 813 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991). Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 
1991). 
2. Did Utah County have a duty, based on Utah statute or 
common law, to use reasonable care to warn motorists using 6000 
West of the perilous sight distance hazard associated with the 
Intersection? 
Standard of Review; In deciding whether judgment as a matter of 
law was proper, the Supreme Court gives no deference to the trial 
court's view of the law; the appellate court reviews it for 
correctness. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomguist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988); Olwell v. Clark, 
658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982). 
3. Did Utah County have a duty to conduct a traffic and 
engineering study before lowering the speed along 6000 West, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-48 (1988)? 
Standard of Review; In deciding whether judgment as a matter of 
law was proper, the Supreme Court gives no deference to the trial 
court's view of the law; the appellate court reviews it for 
correctness. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomguist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989); Mountain Fuel SUPPIV CO. V. 
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Salt Lake Citv Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988); Olwell v. Clark, 
658 P.2d 585 (Utah 1982). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES AND ORDINANCES 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-22 (1988) provides: 
Local authorities, in their respective 
jurisdictions, shall place and maintain 
official traffic-control devices upon highways 
under their jurisdiction as they find 
necessary to indicate and to carry out the 
provisions of this chapter or local traffic 
ordinances, or to regulate, warn, or guide 
traffic. All traffic control devices erected 
under this section shall conform to and be 
maintained in conformance with the Department 
of Transportation manual and specifications 
for a uniform system of traffic-control 
devices under Section 41-6-20. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (1988), provides in pertinent part: 
(2) Where no special hazard exists, and 
subject to subsection (3) and Sections 41-6-47 
and 41-6-48, the following speeds are lawful. 
Any speed in excess of these limits is prima 
facie evidence that the speed is not 
reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful: 
(a) twenty miles per hour when passing a 
school building or its grounds during 
school recess or while children are going 
to or leaving school during opening or 
closing hours, except that local 
authorities may require a complete stop 
before passing a school building or 
grounds at any of these periods; 
(b) twenty-five miles per hour in any urban 
district; and 
(c) fifty-five miles per hour in other locations. 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-48 (1988) provides: 
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(1) When local authorities in their respective 
jurisdictions determine on the basis of an 
engineering and traffic investigation that the 
prima facie speed permitted under this article 
is not reasonable and safe under the 
conditions found to exist upon a highway or 
part of a highway, the local authority may 
determine a reasonable and safe prima facie 
limit which: 
(a) decreases the limit at intersections; 
(b) increases the limit within an urban district; 
(c) decreases the limit outside an urban district, 
but not to less than 35 miles per hour. 
(2) Local authorities in their respective 
jurisdictions shall determine by an 
engineering and traffic investigation the 
prima facie speed for all highways under their 
respective jurisdictions and shall declare a 
reasonable and safe prima facie limit, which 
may be different than the prima facie speed 
permitted under this chapter for an urban 
district. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action to recover for injuries she 
suffered as a result of an automobile collision she was involved in 
at the intersection of 6000 West and 11500 North (the 
"Intersection") in Utah County on January 18, 1990. The 
Intersection was constructed in the early 1980's in connection with 
the development of the Oakview PUD subdivision in Highland City, 
Utah County. The Plaintiff lived in the Oakview PUD at the time of 
the accident. 
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Originally, the developer of the Oakview PUD designed 
11500 North (a/k/a Oakview Drive) to run straight along the 
northern boundary of the Oakview PUD property line. However, the 
Highland City Planning Commission refused to approve the Oakview 
PUD until the developer agreed to move a portion of 11500 North to 
the south such that 11500 North separated the PUDfs common ground 
from the residential lots. However, under this arrangement, 11500 
North intersected with 6000 West approximately 141 feet closer to 
the crest of a hill on 6000 West. Subsequent investigation of the 
Intersection revealed that the Intersection was so close to the 
crest of the hill on 6000 West that it violated the safety 
standards for the construction of intersections which are set forth 
by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
Officials in their publication "A Policy on Geometric Design of 
Highways and Streets." The publication is uniformly accepted by all 
traffic engineers in the State of Utah as the authoritative 
treatise on road construction safety standards. 
The close proximity between the Intersection and the 
crest of the hill on 6000 West created a dangerous sight distance 
problem in that motorists entering the Intersection from 11500 
North will not be able to see motorists entering the Intersection 
from 6000 West, and vice versa, in time to avoid a collision. 
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The Plaintiff brought suit against both Highland City and 
Utah County. The Plaintiff claimed that Utah County had a duty to 
maintain its roads in a condition reasonably safe for travel. This 
duty included a duty to warn motorists of the dangerous nature of 
the Intersection. Plaintiff alleged that Utah County breached this 
duty by failing to place warning signs or using other means to warn 
motorists using 6000 West of the dangerous Intersection and by 
failing to conduct a traffic and engineering study before lowering 
the speed limit along 6000 West. Plaintiff contended that if Utah 
County would have conducted such a study, it would have learned of 
the dangerous sight distance problem at the Intersection, and 
should have installed appropriate safety measures to warn motorists 
using 6000 West of the dangerous Intersection. Utah Code Ann. §41-
6-48 (1988). 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Utah County moved for summary judgment, arguing that it 
had no duty to place signs at the Intersection because 11500 North 
was a private road. Utah County relied on the Utah Supreme Courtfs 
ruling in Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 478 P.2d 496 (Utah 1970), 
for the proposition that it had no duty to warn users of 6000 West 
of the private road entering the Intersection. 
Plaintiff opposed the summary judgment, arguing that Utah 
County had a duty to warn and that this duty was not eliminated by 
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the Stevens decision. Plaintiff also argued that there were several 
genuine issues of material fact, including, among others: (1) did 
Utah County have notice of the dangerous condition?; (2) was Utah 
County negligent per se because it failed to conduct a traffic and 
engineering study prior to lowering the speed limit along 6000 
West?; (3) would a "blind intersection" sign have prevented this 
accident?; (4) would a "blind intersection" sign with flashers have 
prevented the accident?; (5) would the installation of flashers 
have prevented this accident?; (6) would the accident have been 
prevented if Utah County would have conducted the legally mandated 
traffic and engineering study? Plaintiff argued that if these 
factual issues were resolved in her favor, the legal principles 
governing this area of the law would mandate a judgment for the 
Plaintiff. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The trial court granted summary judgment on the basis of 
Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 478 P.2d 496 (Utah 1970) and Jones v. 
Bountiful City, 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992). The Court held that 
Utah County did not have a duty to protect users of either 6000 
West or 11500 North from the dangerous sight distance problem. The 
trial court also ruled that Utah County did not have a duty to 
conduct a traffic and engineering study because it concluded that 
Utah County did not lower the speed limit. 
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V. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. The Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident 
on January 18, 1990, at the Intersection in Highland City, Utah 
County, State of Utah. R. 165. 
2. As a result of the accident, Plaintiff is a 
paraplegic. R. 347. 
3. 11500 North provides access to the Oakview Planned 
Unit Development ("PUD"). R. 486. The Oakview PUD was developed in 
the early 1980fs and contains eight lots. R. 347. 
4. Paul Frampton was the developer of the Oakview PUD. 
R. 486 (Deposition of Paul Frampton, pp. 5-6). 
5. In developing the Oakview PUD, Mr. Frampton hired 
Richard Clayton to assist him in obtaining approval for the 
subdivision from the Highland City Planning Commission. Mr. Clayton 
had previously developed and obtained approval for another Planned 
Unit Development located immediately to the west of the Oakview PUD 
in Highland City. R. 486 (Deposition of Paul Frampton, pp. 6-7); R. 
353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton, pp. 6-7). 
6. Before a developer can commence construction of a 
PUD in Highland City, the developer must submit a proposed plat of 
the development to the Highland City Planning Commission for 
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consideration and approval. R. 353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton, 
p. 10). 
7. Mr. Clayton hired Nature's Estates Engineering to 
prepare a plat for the Oakview PUD and to submit that plat to the 
Highland City Planning Commission for consideration. R.353 
(Deposition of Richard Clayton, p. 11). 
8. After the proposed plat for the Oakview PUD had been 
completed by Nature's Estates Engineering, it was submitted to, but 
rejected by, the Highland City Planning Commission. R. 353 
(Deposition of Richard Clayton, p. 12) ; R. 486 (Deposition of Paul 
Frampton, pp. 11-13). 
9. In the original plat of the Oakview PUD prepared by 
Nature's Estates Engineering, 11500 North was designed as a 
straight road which ran east along the northern boundary of the 
Oakview PUD property line until it intersected with 6000 West. R. 
597 (Exhibit "A" to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition of 
Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A"); R. 486 (Deposition of Paul Frampton, pp. 11-12); R. 
353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton, pp. 12-13) . 
10. Mr. Clayton and Mr. Frampton were notified by the 
Highland City Planning Commission that before the City would 
approve the Oakview PUD plat, Mr. Frampton would have to move part 
of 11500 North to the south so that the common area of the PUD 
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would be separated from the lots by 11500 North. R. 486 (Deposition 
of Paul Frampton, pp. 12-13); R. 353 (Deposition of Richard 
Clayton, pp. 14-15). 
11. In accordance with the conditions set forth by the 
Highland City Planning Commission, the Oakview PUD plat finally 
accepted by Highland City shows that 11500 North curves to the 
south and cuts through the property such that the common area is 
separated from the home lots. 11500 North intersects with 6000 West 
approximately 141 feet south of where it was originally planned to 
intersect. R. 597 (Exhibit "B" of Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B"); R. 486 (Deposition of Paul 
Frampton, pp. 11-12); R. 353 (Deposition of Richard Clayton, pp. 
12-13). 
12. The Intersection designed by Highland City is 
defective, unsafe, and dangerous because the gradient on 6000 West 
as it approaches the Intersection is excessive. The Intersection is 
also dangerous because southbound vehicles on 6000 West and 
motorists entering the Intersection from 11500 North do not have 
adequate sight distance to perceive and react to each other. 
Motorists entering the Intersection from 11500 North cannot see 
vehicles approaching the Intersection on 6000 West until the 
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vehicle is only 285 feet away. C. Arthur Geurts, a licensed traffic 
engineer in the State of Utah, testified by affidavit as follows: 
7. Specifically, when Highland City required 
the developer (Paul Frampton) to move the 
Intersection from where it was proposed on the 
original plat approximately 141 feet to the 
south as a condition precedent to approval of 
the Oakview plat, the following AASHTO design 
standards were violated: 
a. Approach Gradient: For intersections like the 
one positioned at 6000 West and 11500 North, AASHTO 
specifies that the maximum approach gradient is 6 
percent. Therefore, because Oakview Drive has an 
approach gradient of at least 7 1/2 percent, the 
Intersection violates AASHTO approach gradient 
standards;1 and 
b. Sight Distance: Based on the 85th percentile 
speed of vehicles traveling on 6000 West and the 
excessive approach gradients at the Intersection, 
AASHTO specifies that the Intersection in question 
should have a sight distance in excess of 500 feet. 
Therefore, because the sight distance at the 
Intersection is only 265 feet, the Intersection 
violates AASHTO sight standards. 
8. Based on the results of my traffic study 
and the specific violations of the AASHTO 
1
 "When the approach gradient of an intersection is greater 
than that specified by AASHTO, the required sight distance for the 
intersection must be increased because the excessive gradient 
negatively effects the acceleration capabilities of vehicles 
entering the Intersection and such vehicles require more time to 
enter the intersection and cross the through lanes of traffic. 
Based on my observations of the land 141 feet to the north of the 
Intersection (where the original Oakview PUD plat proposed the 
Intersection be located), if Highland City had approved the 
original Oakview PUD plat as submitted by the developer (Paul 
Frampton) and his engineers (Nature's Estates), there would have, 
in all probability, been no violation of the AASHTO approach 
gradient standards." 
11 
standards enumerated above, it is my opinion 
that the Intersection is defective, unsafe and 
dangerous and that the specified deficiencies 
were a real and proximate cause of the subject 
accident, 
R. 597 (Exhibit "C" to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
13. Officer Kerry Evans, the officer from the Utah 
County Sheriff's office who investigated the accident, stated in 
his Accident Report that: 
The intersection at 6000 West 11500 North is a poorly 
designed one in my opinion. The north bo[und] traffic 
and the west bound traffic cannot see each other until 
the No[orth] Bo[und] vehicle crests the hill. The 
absence of skid marks of both vehicles in this accident 
shows this. 
R. 597 (Exhibit "D" of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Highland City's Motion for Summary Judgment). 
14. Utah County did not undertake any steps to warn 
motorists using 6000 West of the dangerous sight distance problem 
at the Intersection by use of signs. 
15. Utah County lowered the speed limit along 6000 West 
from the prima facie speed limit of 55 miles per hour established 
by the Utah Legislature. However, there is a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Utah County lowered the speed limit an 
by how much. Officer Kerry Evans testified: 
Q. Do you know what the posted speed limit was 
on this section of road? 
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A. I'm thinking— 
MR. HENNING: Don't guess. I you can't recall, tell him 
your recollection, but don't guess. 
THE WITNESS: 35. 
Q. (Mr. Lund) Was it posted? 
A. Yes. 
R. 354 (Deposition of Kerry Evans, p. 18). On the other hand, Mr. 
Paul Hawker, Utah County's traffic engineer, testified: 
Q. Do you now what the speed limit is on that roads? 
*** 
A. Accurately I don't remember what the speed limit is. 
Q. If the speed limit is not posted on a rural road lie 
that, what would it be by statute, do you know that? 
A. County ordinance states that any county road not 
posted is 40 miles per hour, or has a speed limit of 40 
miles an hour. That road doesn't go 40 miles per hour. 
R. 352 (Deposition of Paul Hawker, pp. 13-14). 
16. Utah County did not conduct a "traffic and 
engineering study" on the section of 6000 West involved in this 
litigation from 1979 through 1989: 
Interrogatory No. 5 Identify all traffic 
engineering studies, speed zone studies and or 
safety studies for 6000 West from Star Route 
(11100 South northerly to 11800 North) in Utah 
County for the years 19799 [sic]-1989. 
Answer: None. 
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(Defendant Utah County's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories, Requests of Admissions and Requests for Production 
of Documents.) 
17. On January 18, 1990, the Plaintiff approached the 
Intersection and stopped. R. 347. The Plaintiff looked both ways. 
She then entered the Intersection. The Plaintiff was hit by a north 
bound vehicle approaching the Intersection on 6000 West immediately 
after she entered the Intersection from 11500 North in an attempt 
to turn south onto 6000 West. R. 597 (Exhibit "E" of Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Highland City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment). 
18. As a result of the accident, Plaintiff is a 
paraplegic. R. 347 (Highland City's Memorandum in Support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[s]ummary judgment should 
be granted with great caution in negligence cases". Williams v. 
Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme Court has 
also held that: "Although summary judgment may on occasion be 
appropriate in negligence cases, it is appropriate only in the most 
clear-cut cases." Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 
1987) . Application of these principles to the instant case demands 
14 
that this case be remanded for a jury determination of Utah 
County's negligence, 
IIA. Utah County had a non-delegable duty to maintain its roads and 
streets in a condition reasonably safe for travel. Bowen v. 
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1982). This duty includes a 
duty to warn motorists of conditions on or adjacent to the road 
which render the road not reasonably safe for travel. 
One treatise typically followed by the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated that as a general rule, a governmental entity has a duty 
"to take proper precautions to guard against accidents by the use 
of railings, barriers, lights, or the like, especially at night." 
18 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 54.90a, at 
pp. 334-35. Similarly, American Jurisprudence has stated that 
"[w]here the responsible public authority has notice of the 
dangerous condition of a highway, it has the duty in the exercise 
of reasonable care to place warning signs thereon, and it is liable 
for injuries proximately resulting from its neglect to do so." 39 
Am.Jur.2d, Highways. Streets, and Bridges. § 398 (1968). Also 
instructive is Annotation, Highways: Governmental Duty to Provide 
Curve Warnings or Markings, 57 A.L.R.4th 342 (1987), which 
concludes that the general rule is that "[m]oreover, it is the duty 
of the responsible public authority to maintain warning signs when 
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reasonably necessary to enable travelers exercising ordinary care 
and prudence to avoid injury." Id. § 2 [a], at 349. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that governmental 
entities must warn of dangerous conditions in their streets and 
roads. For example, in Bramel v. Utah State Road Commission. 465 
P.2d 534 (Utah 1970), the Utah Supreme Court held that: 
The answer to the first proposition is to be 
found in applying the test found so generally 
throughout the law of torts, and which is also 
applicable here: Did the defendant Road 
Commission discharge its duty of exercising 
reasonable care under the circumstances by 
placing adequate and appropriate warning signs 
for the safety of traffic using the highway? 
Id. at 536 (emphasis added) ; see also Carroll v. State Road 
Commission. 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1970). 
Thus, the vast majority of authorities have held that 
governmental entities must warn motorists of dangerous conditions 
in their roads which render the roads not "reasonably safe for 
travel." 
IIB. Utah law also imposes a statutory duty upon governmental 
entities to warn motorists of dangerous conditions in streets and 
roads. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-22 (1988). Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-22 
(1988) states that governmental entities "shall" erect traffic 
control devices to "regulate, warn, or guide traffic." The term 
"shall" is typically construed as imposing a mandatory requirement 
as opposed to a mere direction. Board of Educ. of Granite School v. 
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Salt Lake City. 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983). Thus, Utah County 
has not only a common law duty to warn motorists of dangerous 
conditions on its roads, but it also has a statutory duty. 
IIC. Utah County also has a self imposed duty to warn motorists. 
Utah County has accepted the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices as it standard. The manual provides that "Signs are 
essential where special regulations apply at specific places or at 
specific times only, or where hazards are not self-evident." Manual 
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways, § 2A-1 
(1988). The Manual also provides that: 
Warning signs are used when it is deemed 
necessary to warn traffic of existing or 
potentially hazardous conditions on or 
adjacent to a highway or street. Warning signs 
require caution on the part of the vehicle 
operator and may call for a reduction of speed 
or a maneuver in the interest of his own 
safety and that of other vehicle operators and 
pedestrians. 
Id. § 2C-1 (emphasis added). Thus, Utah County's own standards 
required it to warn motorists of the dangerous condition of the 
Intersection. 
III. The trial court erroneously relied upon Stevens v. Salt Lake 
County, 478 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1970), and Jones v. Bountiful City. 
834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992), in concluding that Utah County did 
not have a duty to warn motorists using 6000 West of the dangerous 
Intersection. Stevens is inapplicable because the Utah Supreme 
17 
Court took great pains to limit the holding of that case to its 
facts. Also, Stevens should not apply to the present case because 
the intersection involved here was between a paved, improved county 
road and a paved, improved subdivision road. Clearly, the Utah 
Supreme Court did not intend by its ruling in Stevens to relieve 
governmental entities of their duty to maintain their roads in a 
condition reasonably safe or travel simply because the causative 
force was not on the road itself. 
The trial court also erroneously relied upon Jones v. 
Bountiful City, 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992). The basis for this 
Court's decision in Jones was that a municipality could not be held 
liable for the failure to install traffic control devices because 
the decision to install such devices was "discretionary". Under 
Utah law, governmental entities have not waived immunity for 
"discretionary" acts. However, Utah County does not have discretion 
to warn motorists of the dangerous condition of its streets. It 
must warn motorists. Carroll v. State Road Commission, 496 P.2d 888 
(Utah 1970). Thus, the Jones decision would not apply to shield 
Utah County against allegations that it failed to warn of the 
dangerous Intersection. Thus, the trial court erroneously relied 
upon Jones in granting summary judgment. 
IV. Plaintiff alleged that Utah County lowered the speed limit 
along 6000 West from the prima facie speed limit established by the 
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Utah legislature (55 miles per hour) without conducting a traffic 
and engineering study as required by Utah law. Utah Code Ann. §41-
6-46 (1988) §41-6-48 (1988). 
The trial court erroneously granted summary judgment 
where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Utah 
County lowered the speed limit along 6000 West. The trial court, by 
implication, ruled that there was no reduction in the prima facie 
speed limit established by the Utah legislature because it did not 
find Utah County liable for its failure to conduct a traffic and 
engineering study. However, Officer Kerry Evans has testified that 
6000 West was posted with a 35 miles per hour speed limit. 
Utah County's failure to conduct a traffic and 
engineering study prior to lowering the speed limit was an actual 
and proximate cause of the accident. If Utah County would have 
conducted the required traffic and engineering study prior to 
lowering the speed limit, it would have learned that vehicles were 
traveling between 45 and 50 miles per hour and that some warning of 
the dangerous Intersection was needed. The failure of Utah County 
to conduct such a traffic and engineering study constitutes per se 
negligence. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN NEGLIGENCE CASES. 
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The trial court held as a matter of law that Utah County 
did not breach its duty to maintain 6000 West in a condition 
reasonably safe for travel and that Utah Countyfs actions were not 
the cause of the accident. The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
"[s]ummary judgment should be granted with great caution in 
negligence cases." Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 
1985)• The Utah Supreme Court has also held that: "Although summary 
judgment may on occasion be appropriate in negligence cases, it is 
appropriate only in the most clear-cut cases." Ingram v. Salt Lake 
City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987). Application of these principles to 
the instant case demands that this case be remanded for a jury 
determination of Utah County's negligence. 
II. 
UTAH COUNTY HAD A DUTY TO WARN MOTORISTS USING 
6000 WEST OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION CREATED 
BY THE INTERSECTION. 
The trial court held that Utah County could not be held 
liable for Plaintiff's injuries because it did not have a duty to 
place signs or use other means to warn motorists of the dangerous 
Intersection. However, as demonstrated below, Utah County had a 
common law, statutory, and self-imposed duty to properly place and 
maintain warning signs along 6000 West. 
A. COMMON LAW DUTY 
20 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a governmental 
entity has "a non-delegable duty to exercise due care in 
maintaining streets within its corporate boundaries in a condition 
reasonably safe for travel. . . and the city may be held liable for 
injuries proximately resulting from its failure to do so." Bowen v. 
Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1982). 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: "The duty of 
municipal corporations with respect to the maintenance and repair 
of traffic signs in this state is set out in 18 E. McQuillin, The 
Law of Municipal Corporations." Richards v. Leavitt. 716 P.2d 276, 
278 (Utah 1985). With respect to the duty to warn, McQuillin 
indicates that there is a broad common law duty to sign roads and 
streets to warn motorists of danger: 
The absence of a sufficient barrier, guard, 
railing, light, [sign], or the like in a 
public way, for the protection of travelers 
using due care who are endangered by the want 
of such precautions, constitutes a defect and 
a want of repair. Accordingly, in addition to 
the duty to repair, the duty of a municipality 
to use ordinary care to keep its streets in 
condition for use includes the duty, where 
there are dangerous obstructions, declivities, 
or excavations in or near the street, whether 
created by the municipality itself or by third 
persons, where it has notice thereof or notice 
is unnecessary, to take proper precautions to 
guard against accidents by the use of 
railings, barriers, lights, or the like, 
especially at night. 
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18 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 54.90a, at 
pp. 334-35 (emphasis added). The word "sign" was placed in brackets 
in the above paragraph because the term was added in the most 
recent supplement to McQuillin to make explicit that a municipality 
has a duty to warn motorists of danger through signs or other 
means. 
American Jurisprudence has also found that a municipality 
has a duty to warn motorists of a danger: 
It is the duty of the responsible public 
authority to exercise reasonable care to warn 
travelers of defects, obstructions, and unsafe 
places in its streets, highways, and bridges 
of which is has or is chargeable with notice, 
by barriers or guardrail, lights, warning 
signs, or other means, which are reasonably 
sufficient for that purpose, and if its fails 
to do so it will be liable to one injured by 
reason of that failure, assuming an exception 
to its sovereign immunity from responsibility 
for its torts. Especially is it the duty of 
the public authority to give such warning in 
the nighttime. 
39 Am.Jur.2d, Highways. Streets, and Bridges, § 397 (1968). 
American Jurisprudence has also found that "[w]here the responsible 
public authority has notice of the dangerous condition of a 
highway, it has the duty in the exercise of reasonable care to 
place warning signs thereon, and it is liable for injuries 
proximately resulting from its neglect to do so." Id. § 398. 
American Jurisprudence has found in relation to the 
proper signing of intersections: 
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Although there is authority to the contrary, 
it has been held that the public authority has 
the duty to maintain adequate traffic control 
signs at dangerous intersections on its 
highways, and the breach of this duty 
constitutes negligence rendering it liable for 
injuries sustained in an accident proximately 
resulting therefrom. 
Id. § 400. 
Also instructive is Annotation, Highways: Governmental 
Duty to Provide Curve Warnings or Markings. 57 A.L.R.4th 342 
(1987). The annotation concludes that the general rule is that 
fl[m]oreover, it is the duty of the responsible public authority to 
maintain warning signs when reasonably necessary to enable 
travelers exercising ordinary care and prudence to avoid injury." 
Id. § 2[a], at 349. 
There is also ample Utah case authority to support a 
municipality's duty to properly warn motorists of hazards. For 
example, in Bramel v. Utah State Road Commission. 465 P.2d 534 
(Utah 1970), the Utah Supreme Court held that: 
The answer to the first proposition is to be 
found in applying the test found so generally 
throughout the law of torts, and which is also 
applicable here: Did the defendant Road 
Commission discharge its duty of exercising 
reasonable care under the circumstances by 
placing adequate and appropriate warning signs 
for the safety of traffic using the highway? 
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Id. at 536 (emphasis added). In Carroll v. State Road Commission. 
496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1970), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed Bramel. 
stating that: 
In the recent case of Bramel v. Utah State 
Road Commission, this Court affirmed a 
judgment against the Road Commission, wherein 
the commission was found to have failed to 
discharge its duty of exercising reasonable 
care under the circumstances by placing 
adequate and appropriate warning signs for the 
safety of the traffic using the highway. 
Id. at 890 (emphasis in original)(footnote omitted). 
Thus, the vast majority of authorities have held that a 
municipality must properly warn motorists of hazards on its roads 
or streets. The public policy for requiring such warnings is self-
evident. An extreme example illustrates the point. Assume that a 
city constructs a road which leads to the edge of a 10,000 foot 
cliff. Can the governmental entity reasonably argue that it was not 
required to place a sign on that road warning motorists of the 
impending doom? The governmental entity could not reasonably argue 
that under such circumstances its roads were in a condition 
"reasonably safe for travel." 
Similarly, Utah County cannot plausibly argue that 6000 
West was "reasonably safe for travel" without some warning that 
motorists using 6000 West were approaching an intersection where 
extra caution was needed due to the inadequate sight distance and 
where there was a probability that, at normal speeds and without 
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extra caution, users of 6000 West would be unable to avoid an 
accident with motorists entering the Intersection from 11500 North. 
Utah County had a common law duty to warn motorists using 
6000 West of the dangerous sight distance problem caused by the 
location of the Intersection. Because the trial court erroneously 
concluded that there was no such duty, summary judgment in favor of 
Utah County was improper and should be reversed. 
B. STATUTORY DUTY TO WARN MOTORISTS 
The trial court based its decision solely on the lack of 
a common law duty requiring governmental entities to warn motorists 
of the dangerous condition of its roads. The trial court did not 
consider whether there would be any controlling statutory duty 
requiring governmental entities to warn motorists. However, Utah 
law requires that governmental entities properly sign roads and 
streets under their control: 
Local authorities, in their respective 
jurisdictions, shall place and maintain 
official traffic-control devices upon highways 
under their jurisdiction as they find 
necessary to indicate and to carry out the 
provisions of this chapter or local traffic 
ordinances, or to regulate, warn, or guide 
traffic. All traffic control devices erected 
under this section shall conform to and be 
maintained in conformance with the Department 
of Transportation manual and specifications 
for a uniform system of traffic-control 
devices under Section 41-6-20. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-22 (1988)(emphasis added). 
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This section of the Utah Code has never been addressed by 
either the Utah Supreme Court or the Utah Court of Appeals. 
However, applying traditional principles of statutory construction 
yields the conclusion that Utah County was required by Utah law to 
warn motorists of the dangerous Intersection. Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6-22 (1988) states that governmental entities "shall" erect traffic 
control devices to "regulate, warn, or guide traffic." The term 
"shall" is typically construed as imposing a mandatory requirement 
as opposed to a mere direction. The Utah Supreme Court has held 
that ,f[w]hile fshall1 has been validly interpreted as directory . 
. . it is usually presumed mandatory and has been interpreted as 
such previously in this and other jurisdictions." Board of Educ. of 
Granite School v. Salt Lake City- 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983). 
Thus, Utah County has not only a common law duty to warn 
motorists of dangerous conditions on its roads, but it also has a 
statutory duty. 
C. UTAH COUNTY'S OWN STANDARDS IMPOSE A DUTY TO WARN 
Mr. Paul Hawker, a traffic engineer for Utah County, 
testified that Utah County had accepted the standards set forth in 
the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and 
Highways.2 This manual is published by the Federal Highway 
2
 Mr. Hawker testified as follows: 
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Administration, and contains standards for the installation and 
maintenance of signs. (The Utah legislature has mandated that the 
Department of Transportation create a manual in substantial 
compliance with this Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. As 
evidenced by Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-22 (1988), Utah County was also 
bound statutorily by this manual). 
This manual requires Utah County to warn motorists of 
hazards on or near the road which render the road not "reasonably 
safe for travel." Specifically, the manual provides that "Signs are 
essential where special regulations apply at specific places or at 
specific times only, or where hazards are not self-evident." Manual 
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways, § 2A-1 
(1988). The Manual also provides that: 
Warning signs are used when it is deemed 
necessary to warn traffic of existing or 
potentially hazardous conditions on or 
Q. Are you familiar with the manual of Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices? 
A. Yes. 
* * * 
Q. How does Utah County view the principles 
set forth in the book? Are they good 
suggestions? Are they strong recommendations? 
Are they principles to be adhered to? How 
would you evaluate them? 
A. Utah County has accepted the manual as our 
standard. 
R. 352 (Deposition of Paul Hawker, p. 21). 
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adjacent to a highway or street. Warning signs 
require caution on the part of the vehicle 
operator and may call for a reduction of speed 
or a maneuver in the interest of his own 
safety and that of other vehicle operators and 
pedestrians. 
Id. § 2C-1 (emphasis added). 
Utah County's own standards required it to properly sign 
that portion of 6000 West, including appropriate warnings of the 
upcoming dangerous Intersection. 
Thus, Utah County had a duty to properly sign the 
Intersection. This duty was based on the common law, on Utah 
statutory law, and on Utah County's own principles and standards. 
As demonstrated immediately below, the cases relied upon by the 
trial court to the contrary are inapplicable. 
III. 
THE CASE AUTHORITY RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL 
COURT IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. 
The trial court relied upon Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 
478 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 1970), and Jones v. Bountiful City, 834 
P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992), in concluding that Utah County did not 
have a duty to warn motorists using 6000 West of the dangerous 
Intersection. However, for the reasons set forth below, these cases 
do not properly state the legal principles which are applicable to 
this case. 
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Any discussion of Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 478 P.2d 
496, 499 (Utah 1970), must begin with a statement of the facts of 
that rather unique case. The plaintiff was riding his "mini-bike" 
along a "pathway" in a vacant lot. He emerged onto a county road 
and was struck by the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that due to 
some tall weeds and bushes, defendant and plaintiff could not see 
each other until it was too late to avoid an accident. Plaintiff 
alleged Salt Lake County had a duty to correct the visibility by 
removing, or forcing the removal of bushes on the adjacent private 
land. 
The Utah Supreme Court correctly held that "[i]t would 
place a wholly impractical burden upon counties if they had to 
assume the duty of correcting such conditions with respect to every 
private way that enters upon a private road." Id. at 499. However, 
as important as this holding is what the Utah Supreme Court did not 
hold. The Court took great pains to limit the holding of Stevens to 
its particular facts: 
In respect to our analysis of the claim 
against Salt Lake County, it is appropriate to 
observe that there is not here presented any 
such broad problem as to whether there may be 
some circumstances where a public road is so 
positioned and/or maintained in relation to 
adjacent conditions that there is created such 
a hazard as to create a "defective, unsafe or 
dangerous condition of the highway." Our 
concern is with the particular facts shown in 
this case[.] 
29 
Id. (emphasis in original)• 
Essentially, the trial court extrapolated the holding in 
Stevens to hold that a governmental entity could never be held 
liable for the dangerous condition of its roads when the danger 
results from a causative force not in the roadway. In other words, 
Utah County argued, and the trial court accepted, the notion that 
so long as the causative force is outside the physical boundaries 
of the road, the governmental entity no longer has a duty to 
maintain its roads and streets in a condition "reasonably safe for 
travel." 
This is contrary to established legal principles and 
common sense. For example, McQuillin has stated that "the duty of 
a municipality to use ordinary care to keep its streets in 
condition for use includes the duty, where there are dangerous 
obstructions, declivities, or excavations in or near the street, 
whether created by the municipality itself or by third persons, 
where it has notice thereof or notice is unnecessary, to take 
proper precautions to guard against accidents by the use of 
railings, barriers, lights, or the like, especially at night." 18 
E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations. § 54.90a, at pp. 
334-35 (emphasis added). 
The fundamental inquiry is not from where the hazard 
arises, but whether or not the road is "reasonably safe for 
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travel." Utah County attempts to distinguish between roads not 
"reasonably safe for travel" due to hazards in the road and those 
roads not "reasonably safe for travel" due to conditions adjacent 
to the road. In both instances, the road is not "reasonably safe 
for travel." In both instances, Utah County's duty to maintain its 
roads in a condition "reasonably safe for travel" is the same. 
There is no support for Utah County's argument that it does not 
have to fulfill its duty to maintain its roads in a condition 
"reasonably safe for travel" simply because the causative factor 
leading to the dangerous condition is not on the road itself. 
The limiting language in Stevens was placed there to 
avoid an unwarranted extrapolation of the holding of that case. 
The danger in Stevens, an intersection between a "path" and a 
unimproved county road, is vastly different than the intersection 
here, which was between a paved, improved county road, and a paved, 
improved subdivision road. While the governmental entity need not 
provide a warning as to every driveway and path that adjoin road, 
it should be required to warn of dangerous intersections between 
roads within the public road system. 
The trial court also relied upon this Court's decision in 
Jones v. Bountiful City. 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992). In Jones, 
this Court held: 
Rather than placing a duty on a municipality 
to erect traffic control devices, the common 
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law requires only that once the municipality 
takes action to install such devices, it must 
do so in a non-negligent manner. 
Id. at 560 (quoting 19 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal 
Corporations, § 54.28b, at 90 (3d ed. 1985)). The language from 
McQuillin relied upon by this Court in the Jones decision was as 
follows: 
Thus, though a city is not generally liable 
for failure to install signs or signals, if it 
undertakes to do so and invites public 
reliance on such signs or signals, it may be 
held liable for creating a dangerous condition 
or nuisance.2 
Id. (footnote in original). Consideration of the footnote is 
essential. McQuillinfs statement that a municipality cannot be held 
liable for its failure to install traffic control devices is based 
on the ruling of many courts that the decision as to whether or not 
to install traffic control devices is a "discretionary" act for 
which immunity has been retained. 
However, a governmental entity does not have discretion 
to chose to warn or not warn motorists of a dangerous condition in 
its roads. It must provide a warning. Thus, there is no immunity 
and the governmental entity may be sued. For example, McQuillin has 
stated that: 
2
 Governmental function immunity as applied to traffic 
lights and signs, see ch. 53. 
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In addition, even in jurisdictions providing 
for sign placement immunity, a public entity 
may be liable for the creation of a dangerous 
condition if it fails to post signs. 
McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations. § 53.42. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that a municipality 
is not immune from allegations that it failed to warn. In Carroll 
v. State Road Commission, 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1970), the Utah 
Supreme Court held: 
In the instant action, the decision of the 
road supervisor to use berms as the sole means 
of protection for the unwary traveler was not 
a basic policy decision essential to the 
realization or accomplishment of some basic 
governmental policy, program, or objective. 
His decision did not require the exercise of 
basic policy evaluation, judgment, and 
expertise on the part of the Road Commission. 
His determination may properly be 
characterized as one at the operational level 
of decision making, and the trial court did 
not err in its ruling that the discretionary 
exception of Section 63-30-10(1) of the 
Governmental Immunity Act was not a defense to 
the alleged acts of negligence. 
Id. at 891-92. Perhaps a more crisp statement of the law was made 
by Justice Ellett, concurring in Carroll: 
In this case there was no place for discretion 
to give or not to give an adequate warning to 
the motoring public. The duty on the part of 
the State to give and maintain a reasonably 
adequate warning was absolute, and I am unable 
to see where discretion is involved. 
Id. at 892. Utah County cannot claim that its failure to warn was 
based on a "discretionary" act. It follows that it cannot rely on 
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Jones to shield itself from liability, for Jones was based on 
governmental immunity which Utah County does not have. 
The Supreme Court of Florida faced similar issues in 
Department of Trans, v. Neilson, 419 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1982). There, 
the plaintiffs were injured when they traveled through an 
unregulated intersection and were struck by another vehicle. They 
sued the Department of Transportation alleging that it failed to 
sign the intersection. The Florida Supreme Court distinguished 
between the decision not to place traffic control devices at the 
intersection and the decision not to warn motorists of the 
dangerous intersection: 
In our view, decisions relating to the 
installation of appropriate traffic control 
methods and devices or the establishment of 
speed limits are discretionary decisions which 
implement the entity's police power and are 
judgmental, planning level functions. 
Id. at 1077. However, with respect to the duty to warn, the Supreme 
Court of Florida held: 
The failure to so warn of a known danger is, 
in our view, a negligent omission at the 
operational level of government and cannot 
reasonably be argued to be within the 
judgmental, planning-level sphere. Clearly, 
this type of failure may serve as the basis or 
an action against the governmental entity. 
Id. at 1078. Thus, the Court held that if the plaintiff alleged 
that the government failed to warn of the intersection, it could be 
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held liable, but if the sole contention was that the government 
failed to sign the intersection, it could not be held liable. Id. 
Thus, the underlying basis for the Jones decision was 
that a governmental entity has discretion to erect traffic control 
devices. But the entity does not have discretion to warn of 
dangerous conditions in its roads and streets. The principles of 
governmental immunity and, ultimately, the decision of this Court 
in Jones do not apply to the present case because Plaintiff has 
alleged a failure to warn. The trial court erroneously applied 
Jones v. Bountiful City. 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992), to the 
present case. 
In sum, Utah County had an absolute, non-delegable duty 
to place warning signs or otherwise warn motorists of the dangerous 
Intersection. Those cases relied upon by the trial court are 
inapplicable. Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's ruling that Utah County did not have a 
duty to warn of the dangerous Intersection, and remand this matter 
for a trial on the merits. 
IV. 
UTAH COUNTY WAS NEGLIGENT IN FAILING TO 
CONDUCT A TRAFFIC AND ENGINEERING STUDY OF 
6000 WEST BEFORE REDUCING THE SPEED LIMIT. 
In its memorandum opposing Utah County's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argued that Utah County was negligent 
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in that it failed to conduct a traffic and engineering study prior 
to reducing the speed limit along 6000 West. The source of Utah 
County's duty to conduct such an investigation is found in the 
following statutes: 
(2) Where no special hazard exists, and 
subject to subsection (3) and Sections 41-6-47 
and 41-6-48, the following speeds are lawful. 
Any speed in excess of these limits is prima 
facie evidence that the speed is not 
reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful: 
(a) twenty miles per hour when passing a 
school building or its grounds during 
school recess or while children are going 
to or leaving school during opening or 
closing hours, except that local 
authorities may require a complete stop 
before passing a school building or 
grounds at any of these periods; 
(b) twenty-five miles per hour in any urban 
district; and 
(c) fifty-five miles per hour in other locations. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (1988). Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-48 (1988) 
provides: 
(1) When local authorities in their respective 
jurisdictions determine on the basis of an 
engineering and traffic investigation that the 
prima facie speed permitted under this article 
is not reasonable and safe under the 
conditions found to exist upon a highway or 
part of a highway, the local authority may 
determine a reasonable and safe prima facie 
limit which: 
(a) decreases the limit at intersections; 
(b) increases the limit within an urban district; 
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(c) decreases the limit outside an urban district, 
but not to less than 35 miles per hour. 
Id. Thus, under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-48 (1988), the prima facie 
speed limit for 6000 West was 55 miles per hour. R.683 (Affidavit 
of C. Arthur Guerts, J 1). If the speed limit was lowered, it must 
be based upon a traffic and engineering study. Plaintiff contended 
that Utah County lowered the speed to 35 miles per hour in March, 
1988, and therefore, was required to conduct a traffic and 
engineering study. Utah County responded that the sign referred to 
by Plaintiff governed southbound traffic. (The driver involved in 
the accident was traveling northbound at the time of the accident.) 
Thus, the trial court concluded that Utah County was under no duty 
to conduct a traffic and engineering study because it did not lower 
the speed limit. 
This ruling was in error for two reasons. First, there is 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not Utah County 
lowered the speed along 6000 West. Officer Kerry Evans testified: 
Q. Do you know what the posted speed limit was 
on this section of road? 
A* I'm thinking— 
MR. HENNING: Don't guess. I you can't recall, tell him 
your recollection, but don't guess. 
THE WITNESS: 35. 
Q. (Mr. Lund) Was it posted? 
A. Yes. 
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R. 354 (Deposition of Kerry Evans, p. 18). On the other hand, Mr. 
Paul Hawker, Utah County's traffic engineer, testified: 
Q. Do you now what the speed limit is on that roads? 
*** 
A. Accurately I don't remember what the speed limit is. 
Q. If the speed limit is not posted on a rural road lie 
that, what would it be by statute, do you know that? 
A. County ordinance states that any county road not 
posted is 40 miles per hour, or has a speed limit of 40 
miles an hour. That road doesn't go 40 miles per hour. 
R. 352 (Deposition of Paul Hawker, pp. 13-14). 
Thus, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the 
speed limit along 6000 West prior to the accident. The speed limit 
could have been 35 miles per hour as testified to by Mr. Evans or 
it could have been unposted, in which case Mr. Hawker believes it 
would have a speed limit of 40 miles per hour. In fact, 6000 West 
could have been posted with another speed limit. The Plaintiff 
cannot state to this Court with any degree of certainty what the 
speed limit is along 6000 West. Utah County has also not set forth 
what the speed limit along that road was. All the Plaintiff has to 
go on is the testimony of Officer Evans that the road was posted 
with a 35 miles per hour sign. The trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment in light of this genuine issue of material fact. 
The second error in the trial court's ruling was that it 
assumed if 6000 West did not have a posted speed limit, Utah County 
did not have a duty to conduct a traffic and engineering study. 
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However, as noted above, Mr. Hawker has testified that if the road 
is not posted, Utah County has established a prima facie speed 
limit of 40 miles per hour. The Utah legislature, under the 
following statute, has mandated that if Utah County is going to 
lower the prima facie speed limit on roads in its jurisdiction, as 
Utah County did here, it must first conduct a traffic and 
engineering study: 
(2) Local authorities in their respective jurisdictions 
shall determine by an engineering and traffic 
investigation the prima facie speed for all highways 
under their respective jurisdictions and shall declare a 
reasonable and safe prima facie limit, which may be 
different than the prima facie speed permitted under this 
chapter for an urban district. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-48 (1988). 
Under Utah statute, any reduction in the speed of a road 
from the prima facie speed limit established by the legislature 
must be done pursuant to a traffic and engineering study. Here, 
there is a genuine issue of fact as to how much Utah County lowered 
the speed limit from the 55 miles per hour speed limit established 
by the legislature. Based on the testimony elicited to date, it 
seems clear that Utah County either lowered the speed limit to a 
posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour or has not posted the road, 
which Mr. Hawker has testified means the road has a speed limit of 
40 miles per hour. In either case, the speed limit has been lowered 
from 55 miles per hour. Under state statute, this reduction in the 
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speed limit could legally be done only pursuant to a traffic and 
engineering study. Utah County's failure to obey the state statute 
renders it negligent. 
Utah County has conceded that it failed to conduct a 
traffic and engineering study along 6000 West prior to reducing the 
speed limit: 
Interrogatory No. 5 Identify all traffic 
engineering studies, speed zone studies and or 
safety studies for 6000 West from Star Route 
(11100 South northerly to 11800 North) in Utah 
County for the years 19799 [sic]-1989. 
Answer: None. 
(Defendant Utah County's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories, Requests of Admissions and Requests for Production 
of Documents.) Thus, Plaintiff has established that Utah County had 
a duty under state statute and that it breached that duty by 
failing to conduct a traffic and engineering study prior to 
lowering the speed limit along 6000 West. 
The failure of Utah County to conduct a proper traffic 
and engineering study prior to lowering the speed limit along 6000 
West was an actual and proximate cause of the accident. In order 
to understand Plaintiff's position regarding causation, it is 
essential to understand one simple principle of highway design: 
motorists will travel at or around the 85th percentile speed 
regardless of the posted speed limit. (The 85th percentile speed is 
40 
the speed at which 85 percent of vehicles travel at or below.) 
Plaintiff fs expert witness, C. Arthur Guerts, opined that "vehicles 
will travel at or near the 85th percentile speed regardless of the 
posted speed limit." R. 683 (Affidavit of C. Arthur Guerts, f 13). 
Mr. Paul Hawker also testified that "the goal a lot of times is to 
have a road speed limit at what 80 percentile of the traffic is 
doing." R. 352 (Deposition of Paul Hawker, p. 15). 
Mr. Guerts testified that based upon his investigation, 
the "85th percentile" speed for vehicles traveling north on 6000 
West is 48.1 miles per hour. R. 683 (Affidavit of Arthur Guerts, f 
12) . Applying the above principle of highway design, motorists will 
travel at or near 48 miles per hour regardless of the posted speed 
limit. 
Utah County has conceded that two elements it considers 
when conducting a proper traffic and engineering study is the speed 
of traffic and any attendant sight distance problems.3 If Utah 
Interrogatory No. 4: Detail factors that are considered 
in determining speed limits and intersection safety 
improvement. 
Answer: The defendant objects to Interrogatory No. 4 on 
the grounds that it is overly broad and unduly burdensome 
and impossible to answer with any particularity. Without 
waiving the foregoing objections, the defendant responds 
that it utilizes factors considered in the Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices and other guidelines. 
Included among the elements to be considered are the 
following: 
a) Traffic Counts 
41 
County would have conducted a traffic and engineering study in 
accordance with its own standards in this case, it would have 
discovered that traffic was going to travel at or near 48 miles per 
hour and that at that speed, there was a danger that motorists 
would not be able to avoid an accident with motorists entering the 
Intersection from 6000 West. Utah County would have learned that 
additional measures were needed to warn motorists of the sight 
distance problem in order to avoid injury. Mr. Guerts opined that 
"if Utah County would have conducted a proper engineering and 
traffic investigation prior to the installation of the 35 miles per 
hour speed limit on 6000 West, it would have discovered that 
corrective measures were needed to protect motorists using 6000 
West from the hazard which existed due to the limited sight 
distances at the intersection of 6000 West and 11500 North." R. 683 
(Affidavit of C. Arthur Guerts, f 16). 
As discussed above, the trial court resolved this claim 
by concluding that Utah County did not lower the speed limit from 
b) Previous Accident History, 
c) Sight Distance and Angle Problems, 
d) Area Traffic Patterns and Speeds, 
e) Right of way and Road Problems 
f) History of Weather Problems 
g) Input from others (law enforcement, UDOT, school 
bus, public, etc.) 
(Defendant Utah County's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of 
Interrogatories, Requests of Admissions and Requests for Production 
of Documents (emphasis added)). 
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55 miles per hour along 6000 West, despite the testimony of Officer 
Evans that the road had a posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour 
and the testimony of Utah County's own traffic engineer, Paul 
Hawker, who testified that an unposted road had a speed limit of 40 
miles per hour. The summary judgment in favor of Utah County should 
be reversed in order to resolve these genuine issues of material 
fact. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the summary judgment granted to 
Utah County. 36^ ir< DATED this «8*y day of April, 1993. 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Stepnen G. Morgan /I 
Joseph E. Minnock 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
43 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
&>-* 
I hereby certify that on the <?q day of April, 1993, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
to be hand-delivered to the following: 
Lee C. Henning 
David C. Richards 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorney for Utah County 
510 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
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